Este artículo examina la preconcepción epicúrea y diversos problemas relacionados con su adquisición y función, tanto en el ámbito teórico como en el práctico. Los autores ponen de relieve que en el modelo contractual epicúreo la justicia constituye una modalidad de lo útil y la preconcepción de lo justo opera como un canon para validar las leyes en las comunidades políticas. Examinan asimismo el vínculo entre el lenguaje y la justicia en el epicureísmo, centrándose primero en el papel del lenguaje (...) en la genealogía epicúrea de la justicia y, luego, en las conexiones entre el aprendizaje del lenguaje y la prolepsis de lo justo en las comunidades políticas constituidas. Subrayan, para concluir, que el aprendizaje del lenguaje es un ingrediente relevante de la experiencia para comprender la génesis empírica de la preconcepción epicúrea. (shrink)

The Stoics incorporeals are "somethings" which, albeit nonexistent strictly, are subsistent. For the Stoics things truly existent are bodies. So, the question is: what role do incorporeals play in Stoic ontology? The author endeavors to demonstrate that the interpretation that incorporeals are secondary realities (bodies being the primary ones) is not consistent with Stoic philosophy as a whole. At this point the argument is that bodies and incorporeals serve to complement each other in the sense that one cannot exist without (...) the other. Thus, between them there seems to be a reciprocal dependence. (shrink)

En este ensayo se argumenta que la tesis estoica de la igualdad natural entre los seres humanos presupone una reconsideración radical de la noción de naturaleza, probablemente inspirada en el sofista Antifonte. Aunque los estoicos parecen considerar el naturalismo antifonteo, centrado en las facultades corpóreas, y reconocen la distinción clásica ‘convencional-natural’ aplicada a la diferencia entre griegos y bárbaros, desarrollan la tesis de la igualdad de naturaleza en dirección de una teoría de la justicia y la ley natural que supera (...) la identidad de naturaleza entendida como necesidad corpórea. El autor sostiene que ese desarrollo se funda en la tesis estoica de la familiaridad. This essay argues that the Stoic thesis of natural equality among human beings presupposes a radical reconsideration of the notion of nature, probably inspired on Antiphon the sophist. Even though the Stoics seem to consider the Antiphontean naturalism, focused on bodily faculties, and recognize the “conventionalnatural” classical distinction applied to the difference between Greeks and barbarians, they develop the theory of natural equality toward a theory of justice and natural law that exceeds the identity of nature understood as bodily necessity. The author also maintains that this development is based on the Stoic thesis of familiarization. (shrink)

This book offers new insights into the workings of the human soul and the philosophical conception of the mind in Ancient Greece. It collects essays that deal with different but interconnected aspects of that unified picture of our mental life shared by all Ancient philosophers who thought of the soul as an immaterial substance. The papers present theoretical discussions on moral and psychological issues ranging from Socrates to Aristotle, and beyond, in connection with modern psychology. Coverage includes moral learning and (...) the fruitfulness of punishment, human motivation, emotions as psychic phenomena, and more. Some of these topics directly stemmed from the Socratic dialectical experience and its tragic outcome, whereas others found their way through a complex history of refinements, disputes, and internal critique. The contributors present the gradual unfolding of these central themes through a close inspection of the relevant Ancient texts. They deliver a wide-ranging survey of some central and mutually related topics. In the process, readers will learn new approaches to Platonic and Aristotelian psychology and action theory. This book will appeal to graduate students and researchers in Ancient philosophy. Any scholar with a general interest in the history of ideas will also find it a valuable resource. (shrink)

Este ensayo se propone mostrar que, a pesar de la relevancia de la interpretación alejandrina del intelecto agente aristotélico (que Alejandro identifica con dios), tal interpretación no puede ser correcta por razones de orden sistemático que irían en contra de algunas premisas aristotélicas básicas, tanto ontológicas en general como de su noética y psicología en particular. En el desarrollo de su argumento general Boeri destaca la relevancia de algunos argumentos y explicaciones de Pseudo Filópono, quien (correctamente a su juicio) (...) se esfuerza por anclar el problema del intelecto del lado psicológico, lo cual presupone que el intelecto debe tener un “soporte” corpóreo. Una consecuencia de su examen es, según Boeri, que no sólo la interpretación de Alejandro del intelecto agente no constituye una correcta exégesis de De anima III 5, sino también que, al identificar al intelecto agente con el “intelecto que viene de afuera”, con dios y con la causa primera, Alejandro introduce una importante incoherencia dentro de su propia concepción psicológica que reconoce la tesis de Aristóteles de que los estados anímicos “se dan” a través del cuerpo. (shrink)

En este artículo se presenta una nueva traducción al español del breve opúsculo De mystica theologia junto con una introducción al texto. La introducción se concentra en el análisis de algunos puntos que son especialmente útiles para entender el texto en cuestión: su historia y su significado para el neoplatonismo y, aun más importante, su relevancia en términos de una exposición sumamente original de la doctrina cristiana desde la perspectiva de un neoplatónico; la importancia de este texto en la filosofía (...) contemporánea también se hace notar; y, finalmente, su crucial importancia para la así llamada “teología negativa”. (shrink)

Este artículo examina críticamente la reciente traducción e interpretación de la Ética a Nicómaco hecha por S. Rus Rufino y J.E. Meabe. El autor argumenta en contra de la interpretación general provista por los traductores y señala lo que considera que son errores fundamentales de interpretación del texto griego y del argumento general de Aristóteles que se sigue de dicha interpretación. This paper examines critically the recent translation and interpretation of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics done by S. Rus Rufino and J.E. (...) Meabe. The author argues against the general view provided by the translators, pointing out what he takes to be fundamental mistakes in the interpretation both of the Greek text and of Aristotle's general argument. (shrink)

Ésta es la respuesta a la crítica hecha por Ricardo Salles a mi interpretación del compatibilismo estoico. Aunque en parte admito sus objeciones, intento mostrar que algunos textos nos permiten pensar que, aunque lo que depende de nosotros no implique necesariamente acciones alternativas, eso no significa que no pueda implicarlas. También trato de mostrar que un reexamen de la noción crisipea de posibilidad que tenga en cuenta el deseo y la creencia permite explicar por qué no es posible llevar a (...) cabo las acciones X e Y en un tiempo dado, lo cual indicaría que la posibilidad específica también excluye acciones alternativas. /// This is the reply to Ricardo Salles' criticism of my interpretation of the Stoic compatibilism. Although I partially admit his objections, I intend to show that some texts allow us to think that, even though what depends on us does not necessarily imply alternative actions, this does not mean that it can not imply them. I also endeavour to show that a re-examination of the Chrysippean notion of possibility taking into account desire and belief permits to explain why it is not possible to perform the actions X and Y in a given time, which would indicate that the specific possibility rules out alternative actions as well. (shrink)

This is the translation of Pierre Hadot’s La citadelle Interèrieure: Introduction aux Pensèes de Marc Aurële. Professor Hadot seeks to provide an introduction to the reading of the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. As a general recommendation for the understanding of ancient works, Hadot suggests relocating them within their context and encourages the reader to let the author speak and stand close to the text. In this vein, representative pieces of the Meditations are cited at length and commented on. The aim (...) of Hadot is not to write a biography of Marcus Aurelius but to ask how he came to write the Meditations which, in his view, is the same as asking how he became a philosopher. The author reminds us that a philosopher in antiquity was not necessarily a theoretician of philosophy but someone who lived like a philosopher. Cato the Younger, he argues, was a philosopher but he did not write any philosophical treatise. Both Cato and Marcus Aurelius, however, considered themselves philosophers since they had adopted a philosophical way of life. At first sight this claim seems reasonable; it is certainly true that in antiquity writing philosophical treatises was not a condition for being a philosopher. Indeed a clear example of this is Socrates, but it would not be fair to compare Socrates with Cato the Younger. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the Epicurean genealogy of justice and laws presuppose an analysis of the just as a modality of the useful, an approach that denies the conventional character of justice. This genealogical pattern differentiates the origin of justice from that of the law and refers to friendship as a relevant explanatory factor of the origin of justice. We maintain that the interpretations that underline the incoherence of this reference to friendship, in the framework of a hedonistic (...) theory, presuppose a non-Epicurean sharp distinction between altruism and selfishness. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the fact that there were prominent citizens of different Greek cities who adhered to Epicureanism, felt themselves Epicurean, and were recognized as such, shows that slogans such as “live unnoticed” and “do not participate in politics” (which suggest a complete apoliticism on Epicurus’ and the Epicureans’ part) misrepresent the true meaning of the Epicurean staying away from contingent politics. Our article shows the interaction between Epicurus and the Epicureans and the Greek cities through the (...) analysis of documents (some of them, well known -such as Epicurus’ Testament, which shows the connections of the philosopher with the political life of the city-, others less known of epigraphic character) related to different ancient cities. If what we argue is sound, the usual idea that Epicureanism recommends apoliticism must be discarded. (shrink)

El propósito en este artículo es mostrar que, a pesar del juicio lapidario de algunos estudiosos de las últimas décadas respecto del interés filosófico del bizantino Miguel de Éfeso, es posible encontrar aspectos relevantes en sus lecturas e interpretaciones de Aristóteles. Argumentaré que el comentario de Miguel al _De motu animalium_ merece ser tratado seriamente. En la medida en que Miguel a veces emplea un modelo conceptual estoico para explicar Aristóteles, propone una idea nueva sobre cómo entender la teoría aristotélica (...) de la acción. Las interpretaciones del texto aristotélico por parte de Miguel no son meras repeticiones; en algunos pasajes se advierten desarrollos que van más allá de Aristóteles, aun cuando presuponen premisas aristotélicas bastante claras. (shrink)

Although philosophy of mind is a hot topic in contemporary philosophy, Ancient theories of the mind are not usually taken into consideration. In this Introduction we briefly focus on some of the reasons why the Ancient conceptions of the mind tend not to be considered seriously any more. We try to account for why it is still reasonable to study some theories that apparently have been overcome by contemporary science of the mind. Although one can grant that Ancient theories of (...) the mind may not be a starting point for a contemporary philosopher of mind, we suggest that the approaches of the Ancient philosophers still provide insights to those who are interested in investigating the mind-body problem. Ancient discussions of the mind, we hold, should not be taken as archeological pieces that can be easily neglected. Even though we recognize that some ingredients of Ancient theories in fact are ‘archeological’, we hold that their philosophical analysis, inasmuch as it can contribute to clarifying problems that have not been resolved yet, can be dealt with seriously. Finally, this Introduction also describes briefly the contents of this book. (shrink)

Aristotelian scholars tend to reject the Cartesian dualism as applied to Aristotelian model of the soul, and favor the view that denies that the soul is radically opposed to body. This is so due the fact that Aristotle takes the living being to be a unified whole. I start by reminding that both Plato and Aristotle argue that by their very nature soul and body are different, but at the same time they maintain that there are things that are ‘common’ (...) to soul and body. The issue is how it is possible that two entities so different in nature have something in common. I argue that the key to the problem lies in the fact that both Plato and Aristotle regard the soul and the body as capacities, and that – in so far as they are able to act and to be acted upon – such is the ‘commonality’ shared both by soul and body. Given that capacities are relational entities, both of them turn out to be very plastic notions that should not necessarily be understood as entirely foreign to each other. (shrink)

Este artículo se concentra en la discusión crítica que Pseudo Justino dirigió hacia ciertos principios básicos de la filosofía de la naturaleza de Aristóteles. Pseudo Justino dirige su crítica a la doctrina aristotélica de la eternidad del movimiento, del tiempo y del mundo. También argumenta contra Aristóteles para mostrar la no-eternidad del éter, implicando una unificación de los reinos terrestre y celestial.

This paper focuses on Pseudo Justin's objections to Aristotle's cosmological doctrines, and aims to show that, as a result of his criticisms to Aristotle's viewpoints, an entirely new view of the natural world bursts in. A few arguments by Pseudo Justin against the Aristotelian cosmology are analysed, and the author shows that Pseudo Justin makes use of conceptual tools and of some assumptions Aristotelian in character without resorting to the creationist argument. If what is suggested in this paper is sound, (...) Pseudo-Justin would have put forward and advanced for the first time some aspects of the physical model which turned out to be dominant from Modernity onwards several centuries before the new approach to nature starting in the XVII century. (shrink)